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CaseNo.20070368-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Jesse Valdez,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft, a third degree felony. This Court
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court plainly err by not intervening sua sponte when an officer
incidentally referred to defendant's -post-Miranda silence, where the prosecutor
never asked the officer any questions about defendant's silence, and where the
prosecutor never commented on defendant's silence to the jury?
Standard of Review: To obtain relief under the plain error doctrine, defendant
must show that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable

likelihood of a more favorable outcome" for the defendant. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201,1208 (Utah 1993).
2. Did defendant's trial counsel act deficiently by responding to the officer's
comment on cross-examination, rather than with an immediate objection, where the
objection would have been futile, and where the objection would have likely drawn
negative attention to defendant's post-Miranda silence?
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6,89
P.3d 162. To demonstrate ineffectiveness, "defendant must show: (1) that counsel's
performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that
but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable
outcome at trial." Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
"Failure to satisfy either prong will result in our concluding that counsels behavior
was not ineffective." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, J 38,55 P.3d 1131.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules in this
case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of theft, a third degree felony. R. 1.
Following trial, defendant was convicted by a jury. R. 79. Prior to sentencing,
2

defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment, arguing that the prosecutor had
improperly referred to his post-Miranda silence. R. 93-103. The court denied
defendant's motion. R. 131-144. Defendant timely appealed. R. 161.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Defendant places several items in his pants pockets while shopping
and then leaves the store
On May 19,2005, Officer Joseph Otte observed defendant inside the Deseret
Industries thrift store in Provo. R. 109:13-14.2 Officer Otte was a police officer with
the Provo City Police Department, but worked part-time as a plainclothes security
officer at the Deseret Industries during his off-duty hours. R. 109:13.
Officer Otte saw defendant take a "large handful" of discount jewelry from a
display, look through the items that he had picked up, and then put some of the
items back in the display. R. 109:16, As defendant walked away, he //conceal[ed]//
the remaining pieces of jewelry in his right hand. R. 109:16. Shortly thereafter,
Officer Otte saw defendant turn a corner and head toward a vacant area of the store.
R. 109:17. When Officer Otte regained sight of defendant a few moments later,

1

"In setting out the facts from the record on a p p e a l . . . all conflicts and
doubts" are resolved "in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial
court." State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, f 1 n.l, 42 P3d 1248 (quotations and citation
omitted).
2

Though the transcriber spelled officer's name as "Aude," the Utah County
Attorney's Office and Provo Police Department both spell it "Otte." R. 1,2.
3

defendant's right hand was empty. R. 109:17. Defendant did not have a cart or
shopping basket with him at that time. R. 109: 30.
Officer Otte retraced defendant's steps to see if defendant had placed the
jewelry somewhere along the way. R. 109: 17. Defendant had not. R. 109: 17.
Around this time, defendant noticed Officer Otte's presence and began acting
nervous. R. 109: 17. Officer Otte backed off, but kept an eye on defendant as
defendant continued walking through the store. R. 109:17-18.
Defendant eventually got a shopping cart and placed some other items inside.
R. 109: 18. After spending about two and a half hours in the store, defendant
pushed the cart to the front of the store, but then left it next to one of the registers
and walked toward the exit of the store. R. 109:18,21. Before he left, he stopped
and talked with one of the store's door greeters. R. 109:18. Defendant told the door
greeter that he would be coming back later to purchase the items in the cart. R. 109:
20-21. Defendant then left the store and walked toward the street. R. 109:18.
Officer Otte followed defendant out of the store and confronted him. R. 109:
18. Officer Otte told defendant that he "believed that [defendant] had concealed
and not paid for some jewelry items." R. 109:18. Defendant "admitted to taking the
items," so Officer Otte took him back to the store's security room. R. 109:18. Once
there, defendant emptied his pants pockets. He pulled nine pieces of jewelry from
his right pant pocket and a cell phone and electric spell checker from his left pocket.
4

R. 109:20. The cell phone and spell checker both had Deseret Industries price tags
on them. R. 109:20.
Defendant repeatedly refers to Officer Otte's testimony at trial
At trial, defendant claimed that he did not intend to steal the items, but that
he was instead simply walking to the adjacent Deseret Industries outlet store to do
some further shopping. R. 109: 10, 55-60.3 In support of this claim, defendant
repeatedly referred to the fact that he had told the door greeter that he was coming
back to purchase the items he had left in the cart. R. 109:10-11,35-38,55-57.
Defendant did not testify at trial, however, so his counsel was only able to
refer to this conversation because Officer Otte had mentioned it while testifying.
During his direct examination, Officer Otte testified as follows:
[Prosecutor]: Okay. Did you have a conversation with the defendant [after
stopping him outside the store]?
[Officer Otte]: I did have some conversation. I did read him his Miranda
rights, which he under—he said he understood and agreed to speak with me.
He did say that he was - he did contact a brother that was en route to Deseret
Industries to speak with him about some of the items that he had left in the
cart.

3

The outlet store was used to store larger items, such as "bikes[,] barbeques[,
or] lawnmowers." R109:19. At that time, the only way to get from the main store
to the outlet store was to walk outside and enter through a separate entrance. R.
109:36. At the time of the arrest, however, defendant never told Officer Otte that he
was walking toward the outlet store. R. 109:37.
5

When I - 1 asked him about those items. He said that his conversation with
the door greeter was that he informed the door greeter that the items in the
cart were his and that he was going to come back for them, and so he left the
cart next to the cash register which is—well, so that nobody would purchase
them.
I asked him if he had told the doorman about the items in his pockets, at
which time he stated he pled the Fifth and didn't want to answer the
question.
Q: Okay. Once you took that - well, what did you do after you had this
conversation with him? What did you do with him at that point?
A: [Answer omitted].
R. 109:20-21.
The prosecutor did not ask any follow-up questions about defendant having
"pled the Fifth," nor did the prosecutor make any reference to defendant's postMiranda silence at any other point in the trial. Defendant did not object to Officer
Otte's comment, nor did he ever request a curative instruction regarding the
comment. Defendant instead dealt with the issue on cross-examination:
[Defense counsel]: Okay. Your conversation with him was fairly brief,
wasn't it?
[Officer Otte]: It was.
[Defense counsel]: And that was because at some point he told you that he
could see that you were—suspected him of shoplifting and he told you he
didn't want to talk anymore?
[Officer Otte]: That is correct.
R. 109:37-38.
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it did not
strike Officer Otte's testimony that defendant had invoked his right to remain silent
While the government generally cannot refer to a defendant's post-Miranda silence
at trial, however, the Constitution is not violated when an officer makes an
inadvertent or isolated reference to such silence while describing a chain of events.
A constitutional violation instead only occurs when the government uses the
defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach the defendant or otherwise impair his
rights. In this case, the prosecutor never asked Officer Otte any questions about
defendant's post-Miranda silence—either before Officer Otte referred to it or after.
In addition, the prosecutor never referred to defendant's post-Miranda silence in any
statement or argument to the jury. Given this, there was no constitutional error.
Even if the trial court did plainly err, defendant still has not shown that he
was prejudiced by the alleged error. The unrebutted evidence below showed that
defendant walked out of a store with merchandise in his pockets. Although he later
claimed that he intended to purchase the items at the adjacent outlet store, he did
not support this claim by showing that such a purchase was even possible. Thus,
because defendant has not shown that there was a reasonable probability of a
different outcome, his plain error claim fails.

7

Point II: Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for
addressing Officer Otte's comment in cross-examination, rather than by objecting at
the time the comment was made. The decision to not object was not deficient,
however, because any objection would have been futile. In addition, objecting
would have likely cast a negative inference on defendants post-Miranda silence.
Rather than risking this adverse result, defense counsel instead attempted to
mitigate the negative impact on cross-examination. This approach was reasonable
under the circumstances. Even if this Court concludes that defense coimsel acted
deficiently, however, defendant's claim still fails because he has not established
prejudice.
ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it did not sua sponte
strike Officer Otte's reference to defendant's post-Miranda silence. Aplt Br. 9-19.
Defendant also argues that his trial coimsel was ineffective in his handling of the
alleged Doyle violation. Aplt. Br. 19-21. Both arguments should be rejected.

8

I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR BY
FAILING TO STRIKE OFFICER OTTE'S ISOLATED COMMENT
SIM SPONTE
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error by failing to
intervene when Officer Otte referred to defendant's post-Miranda silence. Aplt. Br. 919. To obtain relief under the plain error doctrine, defendant must show that "(i) an
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome" for the defendant. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah
1993). Defendant's claim in this case fails because: (1) he has not shown that the
court committed plain error, and (2) he has not shown that he was prejudiced by
any such error.
First, there was no error in this case. It is well accepted that the State cannot
use a defendant's post-Miranda silence for purposes of impeaching the defendant at
trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,617-20 (1976). It is also well accepted that the State
cannot use a defendant's post-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. State
v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532,534 (Utah App. 1997). This does not mean, however, that all
references to a defendant's post-Miranda silence necessarily violate the defendant's
constitutional rights. Courts have repeatedly held that "the mere mention that a
defendant invoked his constitutional rights does not prima facie establish a due

9

process violation/7 State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,268 (Utah 1998); see also State v.
Maas, 1999 UT App 325, 1 20,991 P.2d 1108; State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801,806 (Utah
App. 1998). Instead, a defendant's constitutional rights are only violated when a
state "use[s] the defendant's silence to undermine the exercise of those rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 268.
A Doyle violation therefore "involves more than simply referring to a
defendant's post-Miranda silence." Maas, 1999 UT App 325,f20. For a violation to
occur, the "prosecutor must specifically inquire about or argue using a defendant's
exercise of his rights in a context that would impeach a defendant's exculpatory
explanation of his conduct." Id. The prosecutor does this by "framing a question"
or making a "comment that demands an explanation from the defendant and raises
the inference that silence equals guilt." Id. Thus, the "mere mention of a
defendant's exercise of his rights does not automatically establish a violation.
Rather, it is the prosecutor's exploitation of a defendant's exercise of his right to
silence which is prohibited." Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
Given this rule, courts have rejected claims of error when the "officer simply
testifie[d] about the circumstances surrounding an interview, a part of which is
defendant's silence, without using defendant's silence to impeach her credibility."
Id. at 125; see also State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326,1328 (Utah 1980); State v. Redding,
2007 UT App 350,f 28,172 P.3d 319. Testimony about post-Miranda silence that
10

was "merely incidentally and inadvertently elicited" does not violate the
Constitution. Harmon, 956 P.2d at 269.
In this case, the testimony about defendant's post-Miranda silence was
"incidentally and inadvertently elicited." Id. The record shows that the prosecutor
did not "frame" any question designed to elicit any comment about the silence.
Maas, 1999 UT App 325, f 20. Instead, Officer Otte's comment came in response to
the more general question of whether he had "a conversation with the defendant"
after defendant emptied his pockets in the Deseret Industries security office. R. 109:
20. This conversation was clearly at issue, as evidenced by the fact that defendant
had already referred to it in his opening statement, as well as by his subsequent
references to it in his cross-examination of Officer Otte and in his closing statement.
See R. 109:10-11 (opening statement); 109:35-38 (cross-examination of Officer Otte);
R. 109:55-57 (closing statement).
In responding to this general question, Officer Otte admittedly mentioned
defendant's ultimate decision to remain silent. R. 109: 21. The prosecutor did not
ask any follow-up questions about this post-Miranda silence, however, nor did he
make any comment about it at any other point in the trial. Thus, the prosecutor
never demanded an "explanation from the defendant" about the silence, nor did the
prosecutor ever affirmatively "exploit[ ] [the] defendant's exercise of his right to
silence." Maas, 1999 UT App 325, f 20 (quotations and citation omitted).
11

"In evaluating whether the disclosure of a defendant's exercise of Miranda
rights is a Doyle violation, a court must look at the particular use to which the
disclosure is put, and the context of the disclosure/7 Maas, 1999 UT App 325, f 21.
In this case, the prosecutor never "used" the comment at all. Thus, there was no
Doyle violation in this case, and the trial court therefore did not commit error, let
alone obvious error.
Second, even if the trial court did obviously err by not sua sponte striking
Officer Otte's comment, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced.
As a threshold matter, defendant is incorrect when he claims that the State
bears the burden of showing that the Doyle violation was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Aplt. Br. 14-19. In State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293 (Utah App.
1997), this Court did suggest that the State bears the burden in such cases. Id. at
1296. Morrison relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619, 628-29 (1993), however, which involved a Doyle claim that had been
preserved below. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 624-25. Brecht said nothing about the State still
bearing the burden in cases where the Doyle claim was raised for the first time on
appeal under the plain error standard, and this Court in Morrison did not cite to any
authority addressing that issue. See Brecht, 507 US. at 628-29; Morrison, 937 P.2d at
1296.
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In State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,122 P.3d 543, however, the Utah Supreme Court
held that the defendant bears the burden when the claim is unpreserved.
Specifically, "a defendant claiming constitutional error who [does] not object at trial
may only argue plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal and thus
must prove prejudice, even if the constitutional error claimed on appeal is structural
in nature/ 7 Id. at f 1 8 . In State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103,132 P.3d 703, this Court
likewise held that the "[defendant has the burden of demonstrating prejudice
despite the fact that he has alleged structural error/7 Id. at \ 11. To the extent that
Morrison suggested otherwise, Morrison has been overruled sub silentio.
Under Cruz and Malaga, the defendant therefore bears the burden of showing
that there was a "reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome" had the trial
court stricken Officer Otte's offhand comment Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Defendant
has not done this. It was imdisputed below that defendant placed nine pieces of
jewelry, a cell phone, and an electric spell checker in his pockets, that he left the
store with them still in his pockets and walked toward the street, and that he then
"admitted to taking the items" when confronted by an off-duty police officer. R.
109: 18-20. Although defendant claims that he was simply walking toward the
outlet store, defendant never mentioned this possibility to the officer during their
conversation after defendant was stopped. R. 109: 37. In addition, defendant did

13

not present an)r evidence showing that there were registers at the outlet store, let
alone that it was possible to purchase the items there.
Given these undisputed facts, the lack of evidence supporting defendant's
theory, and the State's failure to mention Officer Otte's comment to the jury, there is
not a reasonable probability that defendant would have been acquitted had the trial
court stricken the offhand comment sua sponte. This Court should accordingly reject
defendant's plain error claim.
II.
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE
FOR ADDRESSING OFFICER OTTE'S COMMENT IN CROSSEXAMINATION, RATHER THAN BY IMMEDIATELY
OBJECTING TO IT
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in his handling of
Officer Otte's isolated comment. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the defendant "has the burden of proving (1) 'that counsel's performance was
deficient' and (2) 'that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.'" State v.
McClellan, 2008 UT App 48, % 14,167 P.3d 1038 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668,687 (1984)). In this case, defendant argues: (1) that his counsel should have
objected to Officer Otte's initial comment, and (2) that his counsel should not have
compounded the alleged error by referring to it during his cross-examination of
Officer Otte. Aplt. Br. 19-21. Both claims should be rejected.

14

First, defendant's counsel did not perform deficiently by not objecting to the
initial comment. As a threshold matter, this claim fails because the objection would
have been futile. In State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,989 P.2d 52, the supreme court held
that the "failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance" of counsel. Id. at 1 34. As
discussed above, Officer Otte's isolated comment did not violate Doyle because the
prosecutor never asked for the comment, let alone made any reference to it before
the jury. Thus, even if defendant's trial counsel had objected, the objection would
have been denied. Defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails for this reason
alone.
More importantly, even if the isolated comment was unconstitutional, defense
counsel still did not perform deficiently by not objecting to it. In order to show
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must rebut "a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "We give counsel wide latitude to make tactical decisions
and will not question such decisions unless we find no reasonable basis for them."
Taylor v. Warden, 905 R2d 277,282 (Utah 1995) (quotations and citation omitted). If
the "conceivable tactical bases for defense counsel's actions are apparent,
15

[defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and we must assume
defense counsel acted competently." State v. Holhert, 2002 UT App 426,f58,61 P3d
291 (quotations and citation omitted).
Assuming arguendo that the comment was improper, defendant's counsel had
a reasonable basis for not objecting to it. The constitutional concern behind the
Doyle rule is that the improper use of "post-Miranda silence prejudices the defendant
by . . . creating] an inference of guilt in the jury's mind." Byrd, 937 P.2d at 534
(quotations and citation omitted). Once Officer Otte mentioned defendant's silence
below, defense coimsel had a choice of either objecting to it, thereby drawing the
jury's attention to it, or instead ignoring it and hoping that this offhand comment
would not resonate with the jury. When considering similar cases, courts have
repeatedly applied Strickland's strong presumption to find that counsel's choice not
to object was reasonable trial strategy. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72,1 72,
125 P.3d 878 ("Because Ms. Miller may have felt that the objection was futile and
chose not to object for strategic reasons (such as not drawing attention to this
unfortunate information), we will not question her strategy."); see also Humbles v.
Buss, 2008 WL 586420, * 4 (7th Or. 2008) ("It is also entirely possible that counsel
declined to object, for instance, in order not to call attention to the fleeting reference
to defendant's post-Miranda silence."); Glass v. State, 565 S.E.2d 500,514 (Ga. App.
16

2002) (trial counsel "might have preferred not to call attention to the testimony and
have ignored the testimony for strategic reasons"); Jackson v. State, 683 N.E.2d 560,
564 (Ind. 1997) ("Numerous factors bear on the decision to object, including
probable effect on the trial outcome and the possible impact of calling the jury's
attention to the evidence or statement argued to be objectionable/'); State v. Dixon,
790 N.E.2d 349, 363 (Ohio App. 2003) ("[T]he choice not to call attention to this
particular testimony and hope the moment passed was a reasonable matter of
judgment and strategy rather than ineffective assistance. Had coimsel objected to
this testimony, the result may very well have been to emphasize the informant's
credibility in the eyes of the jury.").
Thus, defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that objecting to the
isolated comment would have amplified its potentially negative effect to the jury.
Defense counsel therefore did not perform deficiently by not objecting to the
comment when it was initially offered.
Second, defense counsel also did not perform deficiently when he asked
Officer Otte about defendant's post-Miranda silence on cross-examination.
In Officer Otte's cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
[Defense counsel]: Okay. Your conversation with him was fairly brief,
wasn't it?
[Officer Otte]: It was.

17

[Defense counsel]: And that was because at some point he told you that he
could see that you were—suspected him of shoplifting and he told you he
didn't want to talk anymore?
[Officer Otte]: That is correct
R. 109:37-38.
Under the circumstances, these questions fit defendant's trial strategy.
Defendant's theory at trial was that he did not intend to steal the items, but that he
had instead simply placed them in his pockets while walking to the adjacent Deseret
Industries outlet store. R. 109:10,55-60. In support of this claim, defendant stressed
his willingness to talk to the officer when he was initially questioned. In his
opening statement, for example, defense counsel stated: "You'll hear from the officer
that Mr. Valdez talked to him after he was stopped— You'll hear that he explained
to the officer... the reason he was going over there." R. 109:10. Defense counsel
then stated that defendant "told all this information to the officer after the officer
stopped him. So when the officer stopped him he said, 'Do you have some items in
your pocket?'... [Defendant] didn't say, 'Oh, no, I would never do that. Oh, no I
didn't take anything.' What he said was, 'Yeah, I did.'" R. 109:11. Defense counsel
later echoed this theme during his closing argument: "[W]e do know what Mr.
Valdez's intent was. He told Officer [Otte] what his intent was, and all the evidence
points to that being his intent

Officer [Otte] approached him and he said, 'Did

you put some items in his pocket?' He says, 'Yeah, I did.' He said he put the items
18

in his pocket

K HH.V.S, Ilius, defendant's trial strategy was largely reliant on his

willingness to talk hi (Iff ice r ( >fte.
When Officer Otte referred to defendant's post-Miranda silence, hov\over, 111 ?
jury might have reasonably believed that this undercut defendant's cooperation
defense. Defense counsel could have objected, but, as explained above, the objection
would have been futile and would likely have called negative attention to the
silence. Rather than objecting, defense counsel accordingly waited and simply
addressed tl le iss i le cii iring h is cross-examination nit Officer Ot te. Specifically,

he was "suspected . . . of shoplifting." R. 109: 37. Thus, the implication was that
while defendant was more than willing to explain what had happened, he only
went silent once he learned that the officer suspected him of committing a crimepresumably out of the fear of inadvertently implicating himself. Thus, the
questioning on cross-examination appears to have been nothing more than an

counsel's actions below are therefore internally consistent and reasonable. Defense
counsel did not perform deficiently.
In any event, even if defense counsel's approach was constitutionally
deficient, defendant still has not shown that he was prejudiced by these actions. In
order lo show ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that "a reasonable

probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained
a more favorable outcome at trial." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162
(quotations and citation omitted). "When defendant raises the issues of both plain
error and ineffective assistance of counsel, a common standard is applicable/7 State
v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah App. 1992) (quotations and citation omitted).
"The common standard exists because plain error requires a showing that absent the
error, there is a substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant,
and similarly, the ineffective assistance standard requires a showing that but for
ineffective assistance of counsel, the result would likely have been different for
defendant/' Id. Thus, "[fjailure to meet the plain error requirement of prejudice
means that defendant likewise fails to meet the required showing under the
ineffective assistance of counsel standard/' Id.
As discussed above, defendant has not shown that there is a reasonable
probability that the result would have been different had his counsel approached
the post-Miranda silence issue differently. Defendant was caught after he walked
out of a store with merchandise in his pockets. Though he later claimed that he
intended to purchase the items at the adjacent outlet store, no evidence supported
this claim, other than his protestations to Officer Otte during their encounter outside
the store. "[Credibility determinations," however, "are the exclusive prerogative of
the jury." State v. Robbins, 2006 UT App 324, % 16,142 P.3d 589. In this case, the jury
20

heard defendant's explanation, but it did not believe him. Given the strong
i »\'itifNIIinv of Ms guilt, there was not a reasonable probability that the jury would
have responded differently ml ildciise counsel had1 ,tddj\\sscd the post-Miranda
silence by objecting at the outset, rather Ihan attempting to initit^ale it on i R e examination.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
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